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Abstract
Orthodox neoclassical economics portrays reason as far more important than
emotion, autonomy as more characteristic of economic life than social connection, and,
more generally, things culturally and cognitively associated with masculinity as more
central than things associated with femininity. Research from contemporary neuroscience
suggests that such biases are related to certain automatic processes in the brain, and
feminist scholarship suggests ways of getting beyond them. The "happiness" and
"interpersonal relations" research programs have made substantial progress in
overcoming a number these biases. Analysis from a feminist economics perspective
suggests, however, several fronts on which research could most profitably continue.
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Getting Past "Rational Man/Emotional Woman":
How Far Have Research Programs in Happiness and
Interpersonal Relations Progressed?
Julie A. Nelson

Introduction
Economic research projects on happiness and interpersonal relationships are
making a number of exciting advances, relative to economic orthodoxy. In many cases,
old dogmas are being rejected, and results from cognitive psychology, social psychology,
evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and related scientific fields are enriching economists'
study of human behavior and well-being.
The traditional neoclassical model based on purely rational, purely autonomous
"economic man" is being challenged at many levels. As psychologist Daniel Kahneman
and his colleagues have famously pointed out, human decision making does not follow
strict rules of logic. Instead, “[T]his marvelous creation [the human cognitive system]
differs in important respects from…the rational agent assumed in economic theory.”
(Kahneman 2003, 1454). Our decisions arise from cognitive processes developed over
evolutionary time, through the development of flesh-and-blood bodies with brains and
nervous systems. “Twentieth-century science," neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has said,
" left out the body…” (Damasio 1994, 39). Behavioral economics (using that term in a
broad sense) approaches economics using evidence on what real, embodied humans being
do--rather than what abstract axiom-obeying agents would do, if they existed. An
empirical and experimental approach to behavior is challenging the former blind faith in
deduction from first principles. Brain scans using functional Magnetic Resonancing
Imagery (fMRI) or similar machines are being used to look at how different areas of the
brain--often roughly categorized a specializing in analytical versus affective processes—
react to experiences and participate in decision-making. The Nobel award in economics
given to Kahneman for his contributions to behavioral economics was well-deserved.
Happiness research, likewise, questions the idea that "economic man" is purely
rational. In this field, phenomena such as felt satisfaction with life and experienced affect
play a leading role (Bruni and Porta 2007). In some ways, this follows from the insights
about less-than-perfect rationality: When we can no longer simply assume that choices
lead to the best outcomes, we are forced to reexamine the question of what we mean by
"best." Happiness researchers make important distinctions between the outcomes of
choice and the achievement of well-being, or between "decision" utility and
"experienced" utility (van Praag 2005).
While it is, as yet, a newer and smaller field, the economics of interpersonal
relations is also breaking important new ground. People are not the autonomous monads
assumed in neoclassical theory, but are instead deeply social creatures. In this case too,
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we could appeal to recent advances in social psychology and neuroscience--such as the
discovery of "mirror cells" in the brain (Iacoboni 2008)--to justify opening this new
frontier in economics.
In addition to being intellectually compelling, research programs in happiness and
interpersonal relations (henceforth, "HIR") also have potentially important implications
for how we live. In a time of recession and rapid deterioration of environmental
resources, for example, the finding that we tend to be on a "hedonic treadmill" may be
crucial. Could we perhaps be made better off by shifting personal and social resources
away from materials-using, carbon-emitting activities and towards more relationship and
intrinsic-enjoyment-intensive pursuits (Frank 2005; Pugno 2008)? Such a question cannot
even be asked within the old paradigm.
Once one appreciates the value of these new developments, of course, one may
wonder how economists could have been blind to such phenomena for so long. One sees
that orthodox theory, while conceptually simple and elegant, is consistent neither with
lived experience nor with the findings of many other fields. One can also see that what
currently passes for orthodoxy is itself an aberration from important, longerrunning
themes in economics concerning well-being and the role of emotions and sociality, going
back to figures such as Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith. New horizons for research,
and new ways of understanding economic life, are opened up relative to the mainstream
of economics in recent decades. The strictly neoclassical approach seems to be not so
much characterized by "rigor," as by "rigor mortis."
The news, however, is not all good. Some of the habits of thought that kept us in
the old ruts have not completely disappeared. This essay uses neuroscience and feminist
theory to explain how and why certain old, outdated, and damaging ways of thinking may
continue to permeate much economic research--including research in HIR--and to suggest
some paths to improving the adequacy, reliability, and generalizability of our created
knowledge.

Neuroscientific Findings on Attention and Cognitive Schema
While we generally believe we see the world "as it really is," cognitive
psychology tells us that in fact our perceptions have systematic biases and gaps.
Behavioral economists have begun to explore how these influence the behavior of the
agents we study, but we can also learn interesting and useful things from this literature
about ourselves as social scientists.
Creating truly accurate picture of the world was not the task that drove the
evolution of our brains and nervous system: survival was. We have developed—over
evolutionary time, and also over the time of our own development from infants into
toddlers and children, and finally to adults—cognitive processes that direct our attention
towards the aspects of our environment most relevant to a task at hand, and suppress the
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recognition of distractions. We have also developed cognitive "shortcuts" that reduce the
time it takes to process certain kinds of stimuli, by classifying and grouping them
according to mental constructs called "cognitive schema." Psychological research shows
that cognitive schemas are important ways in which we "organize incoming information
and integrate it—through no conscious act of will—into clusters" (Most, Sorber et al.
2007, 288). Stimuli that correspond to an existing schema can be more rapidly processed
than stimuli that must be individually sorted out and assimilated piece by piece. That is,
absorbing information congruent with a schema can rely on automatic processes in the
mind. On the other hand, trying to take in information that is not congruent with an
existing mental template requires more voluntary, non‐automatic processing, takes more
mental work, and leads to more mental fatigue.
Studies in cognitive psychology reveal how we use schematic congruence and
selective attention to perceive the world. The most well‐known is the "color Stroop
test"(Stroop 1935). In the classic version of this test, subjects are shown a list of the
names of colors—red, white, green, etc.—printed in either all black, or in the colors that
are congruent with the names (e.g., "red" is set in red type), and are instructed to read
these words aloud. Most adults have no trouble reading these lists quickly and accurately.
Then the subjects are shown a list of the same words, but this time the colors of the
typeface are incongruent with the meaning of the word: for example, "red" is set in green
type, and "white" is set in brown type. Laboratory studies show significant decreases in
the average speed and accuracy of adults' reading performance, when presented with this
second list. Various hypotheses have been made about the cognitive processes at work,
but the general agreement is that the brain has to work harder in the second case, to
actively suppress the irrelevant information offered by the typeface color.
Variants of the Stroop test have been done in fMRI laboratories. These studies
indicate that different brain regions are associated with doing the congruent and
incongruent tasks. The Stroop test is sometimes referred to as a test of mental "vitality"
and "flexibility," as people tend to perform worse on it the more mentally tired they are,
and older adults tend to perform worse than prime‐age adults. It can be, roughly speaking,
thought of as a test of how skillful we are at using our voluntary processes to override our
automatic ones, when our automatic processes are not appropriate for the task at hand.
It seems rather obvious that our brains would tightly link the name of a color and
the perception of a color, and have to expend effort to break this link apart. But what
other sorts of automatic associations do we make, and have to expend effort to
overcome?
It turns out that gender—the association of a stimulus with either masculinity or
femininity—is another fundamental cognitive schema. We process things more easily and
quickly if they fit our mental gender constructs, and have to work more if they do not.
This has been confirmed in a number of studies in cognitive science. For example, in a
version of the Stroop test called the "Auditory Stroop Test," subjects hear words read out
loud. When asked to identify, for example, whether a first name is male or female,
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subjects tend to take longer and make more mistakes when, for example, a male name is
read by a female voice (the "incongruent" case), than when a male name is read by a male
voice (the "congruent" case) (Most, Sorber et al. 2007).
Another tool that has often been used to investigate gender (as well as racial)
schemas is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In this test, subjects are instructed to tap a
key to sort a word into the category in which it belongs. In one recent study, for example,
stereotypical associations of masculinity with strength and femininity with weakness‐‐
prevalent in Western, English‐speaking cultures‐‐were used (Knutson, Mah et al. 2007).
In the congruent case, subjects were told to tap one key if the word "feather," for
example, was either male or strong, and another key if the word was either female or
weak. (Most English speakers would classify "feather" as weak.) In contrast, in the
incongruent situation, they would be asked to tap one key if the word was either male or
weak, and the other if the word was either female or strong. Subjects tended to take
longer to respond in the incongruent case. This was also an fMRI study and the
researchers observed that different parts of the brain were activated in the congruent and
incongruent situations. This study demonstrates that gender stereotypes form a cognitive
schema that organizes our thinking in an automatic way, and that it takes mental effort
and flexibility to overcome these habits of thought. Interestingly, correlations between
IAT tests and explicit attitudes about gender (or race) are low enough to suggest that
these automatic processes are often strongly present even in individuals who do not
consciously endorse sexist (or racist) views.
Another tool, called the Gender‐Science IAT, shows how perceptions of academic
disciplines tend to be mentally wound up with gender schemas (Nosek, Banaji et al.
2007). In this test, subjects tend to be quicker at sorting names of disciplines (such as
"chemistry" or "humanities" into congruent "male or science" and "female or liberal
arts" categories [slide], than into incongruent "male or liberal arts" and "female or
science" categories.
Two more aspects of this research into attention and cognitive schemas deserve
mention. First is the aspect of valence‐‐that is, how we regard some things as being of
higher value than others. IAT and fMRI studies suggest that in cases where a category is
attributed with positive or negative valence, the amygdala, a part of the brain often
associated with emotional response, is also active. Most studied in the case of race,
studies sometimes suggest that, in particular, fear responses are activated by the
presentation of disfavored categories.
Second, there is the question of whether these involuntary associations have to
dictate our behavior. Sometimes automatic processing is simply a helpful,
brain‐efforteconomizing move that saves us valuable mental energy. But it can also signal
a rigidity and laziness of mind that creates barriers, when fresh and flexible approaches
would be more useful for the tasks at hand. Fortunately, there is some evidence that
deliberate and conscious effort and practice can at least partly prevent the expression of
implicit associations in behavior. There is also evidence that performance on IATs can be
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influenced by context‐‐for example, various sorts of priming and framing effects ‐‐and
experience, as subjects get more accustomed to making schema‐incongruent choices.
Overall, however, the results indicate that these automatic associations are strong, and
without strong conscious effort and new experiences, they exert considerable invisible
power over the way we think.

Exercising the Brain
Keeping from sliding back into schematic judgments is not an easy task, given the
strength of these unconscious associations. But perhaps practice in breaking out of the old
patterns, and some templates for thinking in new ways, could make it more possible.
The association of masculinity with strength and femininity with weakness, used in the
IAT test discussed earlier, for example, has no doubt arisen from observation of
differences on average between males and females in the ability to lift a heavy weight
using one's upper body, which is an evidence‐based belief. 1 Such an observation creates
distortions of perception, however, when it is illegitimately overgeneralized, via
cognitive schemas and metaphors, to all individuals or to other situations. The association
of masculinity with strength, for example, tends to keep us from noticing that there are
some individual women who can lift substantial weights, and many men who cannot. But
even more perniciously, the association of women with weakness is often extended into
believing that women have weak intellects, are weak‐willed, are morally weak, and so
on—issues for which there is no evidence. We can also note that the association of
masculinity with strength is selective about the dimension in which physical strength is
measured: If we think of strong bodies as bodies that tend to live longer, it is women who
are strong and men who are weak.
Yet the association of men with strength persists. For example, in English the
word "virility" is commonly known to mean "manly vigor." There is no equivalent
commonly‐used word for feminine vigor. In fact, femaleness is commonly characterized
as a lack of masculine attributes. We might diagram this perceived relationship between
gender and value as shown in Figure 1: masculinity is superior and virile; femininity is
inferior and emasculated.
Figure 1: Stereotyped Gender and Valence
masculine superior virile
|
feminine inferior emasculated
But are all things feminine just degraded forms of masculine characteristics? As a
tool for developing a more flexible sort of thinking, a “gender‐value compass” (Nelson
1992; Nelson 1995) may be useful. Consider how the hierarchy pictured in Figure 1, for
example, changes if one refuses to overlay perceptions of gender with judgments of
value, and instead splits off the gender axis from the value axis, as shown in Figure 2:
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Figure 2
Positive
M+
virility

F+
muliebrity

M–
?

F–
emasculation

Masculine

Feminine

Negative
If one looks hard enough in a sufficiently thick dictionary, one can also find the new term
in the figure. “Muliebrity” means “womanliness,” “possessing full womanly powers,” or
“the feminine correlative of virility.” While not a term in common use, it suggests that
alongside and on a par with a masculine, positive strengths we might also consider there
to be feminine, positive strengths. The cross‐diagonal terms illustrate a condition of lack:
for example, “emasculation” is an absence of “virility.” There is, unfortunately, currently
no term in the English language for a lack of womanly vigor.
Or consider the idea that a strong research result is a manly, "hard" research
result. Research that is "soft" or feminine is considered inferior. But suppose we again
break apart the dimensions of gender and value. Consider the compass shown in Figure
3.
Figure 3

M+
hard,
strong

F+
soft,
flexible

M–
hard,
rigid

F–
soft,
weak

A research project, for example, that is "hard" in a rigid way cannot stand up to criticism.
It is a positive complementarity of strength and the flexibility to bend, adapt, and respond
that makes a research project truly resilient. Good research projects are neither
one‐sidedly hard or soft, but rather is both strong and flexible. Thinking instead in
stereotyped "either/or" terms and aiming for only hardness can result, in fact, in a
weakness: The negative complementarity of rigidity and weakness gives brittle findings
that shatter easily. The suggestion of this analysis is that the most creative and productive
options lie in the dynamic tension between the positively‐valued characteristics, often
(lazily) thought of as polar opposites.
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While dualistic, unconscious patterns of thought suggest that our only choices are
"either/or," with some work we may learn to recognize more sophisticated, nuanced,
"both/and" possibilities. In my own work, I have experimented with using such diagrams
to break up many reified gender associations. But for now, it is sufficient to merely
introduce the possibility of getting past old gender‐schematic patterns of thinking about
gender and value, and developing more nuances and flexible thinking along "both/and"
lines.

Gender and Economics I: Topics and Agents
Where does economics fit in? Our discipline was not one of the options presented
to subjects in the IAT study about academic fields discussed above. According to
academic traditions, economics is commonly classified as one of the social sciences,
when it is not put with management. The social sciences, in turn, are generally included
in the "liberal arts." It would be highly unusual to find economics classified with the
physical sciences.
Yet I would expect many economists to resist this classification. Given the
cultural association of masculinity with both positive valence and with science, one might
not be too surprised to find, within our profession, a concerted effort to advance and
preserve the status of economics by advancing and preserving its image of masculinity. In
a culture where giving into femininity is associated being weak, a certain macho swagger
might, in fact, be a rational strategy for gaining positional rewards.
Unfortunately, it also creates bad science. Starting around the 1970s, a handful of
scholars started to identify ourselves as feminist economists, and began to critically
examine this association of economics with masculinity. What makes scholarship
"feminist" is not, as is sometimes thought, an attitude of man‐hating, or an insistence that
men and women are exactly the same. Feminist scholarship, at its most basic, involves a
questioning of the systematic subordination of women, and investigation into the roots of
and remedies for this subordination. We began, in economics, with the simple study of
the demographics of our profession, and questions of labor market discrimination. (I have
found, from personal experience, that even publishing in Econometrica, the AER and the
JPE‐‐as I have done‐‐is still not necessarily taken as sufficient evidence of one's skills in
analysis, if one is a woman (Nelson 2009)). We moved on to critique models of marriage
and household behavior that simply assumed or excused gross inequities in power
between men and women (Ferber and Birnbaum 1977). By the early 1990s, we had
grown in numbers and were examining the role of gender in the shaping the core
definitions, models, and methods, and the history of the discipline (Ferber and Nelson
1993). What we found was a pronounced aspiration to defend the one‐sided "manliness"
of the discipline
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Consider Table 1. Within neoclassical orthodoxy, economics is generally taken to
be defined by concern with markets, choice, or both. Women's experiences in families,
tending to the day‐to‐day bodily needs of people for food and care, are banished (or at
best marginalized). The economic agent of neoclassical theory is autonomous, selfinterested and rational‐‐characteristics that have a long history of association with men
and masculinity in Western culture. Interdependence, other‐interest, and emotion are, in
contrast, culturally coded as both feminine and of lesser importance. Economists were
happy to relegate these issues to (so‐called) "softer" fields such as sociology, clinical
psychology, philosophy, or theology.
Table 1: Splitting the World: Content and Model Schemas in Neoclassical
Orthodoxy
Economics

Not Economics

markets
mental choice

social life and family
bodily experience

individuals
autonomy
self-interest
rationality
masculine

relationships
interdependence
other-interest
emotion
feminine

Let me emphasize, here, that this sort of table is by no means meant to reinforce the idea
that men are really more rational, or women are more really emotional. Feminists make a
distinction between sex, referring to biological distinctions, and gender, the cultural
beliefs that societies construct on the basis of perceptions of sex. Feminist economists
point out that, by looking at only half the world, economics—far from being made more
objective and rigorous by these exclusions—is made partial and biased. And there is a
systematic pattern behind many of orthodoxy's biases: They are, as a group, created and
sustained by the strength of unconscious cognitive schemas relating masculinity to
superior value.
Behavioral economists and HIR researchers, then, can be commended for the way
in which they have made progress in overcoming certain outdated, unconscious habits of
thought. Where neoclassical orthodoxy restricts its attention to only the lefthand side of
Figure 1, in HIR research social relations and emotions of happiness and unhappiness are
made much more central.
There are, however, more adequate ways of getting past the old, dualistic,
gender‐schematic habits, and less adequate ways. One inadequate way is to continue to
let the left dominate, but bring in a few, still‐denigrated, aspects of the right. In some
parts of the behavioral economics literature, for example, it is allowed that people are
emotional, but only to the extent that this may cause them to be "irrational" and make
9
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mistakes (e.g. (Cohen 2005). I take this as a continuing sign of masculinist bias, since
much neuroscience is telling us that emotions are, in fact, an important and necessary
component of cognition and reasonable behavior (Damasio 1994). Or people are treated
purely as autonomous individuals first and foremost, and relationships given a distinctly
subsidiary status. In assuming that people are autonomous individuals who may make
rational decisions about entering relationships, many economists are following
philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his suggestion, “Let us consider men . . . as if but even
now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity,
without all kind of engagement to each other” (quoted in Benhabib, 1987). Yet humans
simply do not spring out of the earth. We are born as infants, nurtured and cared for as
children, socialized into family and community norms, and have bodies that depend on
the provision of nourishment and shelter. These sorts of relationships, of course, are
exactly those in women’s traditional domain. To the extent the new literatures admit
elements of emotion and relationality, but still prioritize reason or individuality, they still
display a masculinist bias.
In other cases, looking at these pairs in terms of dynamic tensions is avoided by
flipping completely over to the right‐hand‐column. Some scholarly literature arising from
certain sociological or "holistic" viewpoints, for example, elevate the right‐hand column
of Table 1, and completely neglect the left.
In fact, the economics literature on interpersonal relationships is quite
reminiscent, so far, of the old story of the blind people and the elephant. In this story, one
blind person encounters the side of the elephant, and says that an elephant is like a wall;
another encounters a leg, and says that an elephant is like a tree trunk; another, the trunk,
and says an elephant is like a snake; and so on. Some economists perceive relationships
in terms of "relational goods" that are "purchased" and enjoyed by rational,
utility‐maximizing individuals. 2 From another perspective, relationships feel like people
merged together in a feeling of oneness with each other and perfect harmony. 3 From yet
another viewpoint, one observes hierarchies of positional status or domination and
submission (Gazier and This Saint‐Jean 2005). From yet another, the phenomenon is
reciprocity among equals (Sacco, Vanin et al. 2004; Bruni and Sugden 2008). Few male
economists have yet examined the part of the elephant that takes the form of hierarchies
dedicated to care and nurturance, most exemplified by a mother with her child. In fact,
family relations of various sorts seem to regularly be under‐analyzed within this new
literature, perhaps due to a biased view that close relations are simply "natural" rather
than truly social. 4 But perhaps that will come with time—and the lessening of gender
biases. To all these, I would reply yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes: They are all part of the
elephant, and only dangerous when their partial nature is not fully recognized. One can
hope that the current predominance of partial views is only a temporary state, and as the
fields develop our sophistication (and mutual tolerance, and ability to use a common
vocabulary) will develop as well.
Perhaps feminist economics can help move this project forward, since we've been
looking at relational issues in detail since the early 1990s. We noticed that stereotypic
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views attributed all agency to individual men, and more or less forcibly merged women
into having interests in only the well‐being of their husbands and children. 5 We called the
one extreme—Mr. John Jones—the "separative self", and the other "Mrs. John Jones,"
with no name of her own—the "soluble self"(Nelson 1995; England 2003). In a
gender‐value compass, this becomes:
Figure 4
M+
Individual

F+
Connected

M–
Separative

F–
Soluble

That is, the really rich and complex analysis that arises from looking at the tension
between the poles of individual separation and social connection, is lost when looking at
the extremes. In Martin Buber’s famous philosophical piece on identity and relation, I
and Thou, he wrote about the fallacies of a non‐relational worldview in which we
imagine either “the world. . .embedded in the I, and that there is really no world at all”
(that is, separativeness), or “the I. . .embedded in the world, and there is really no I at all”
(that is, solubility) (1958, 71‐2). (1958, pp. 71, 72). A truly relational worldview retains
the tension.
From this, still very simple, exercise, one can create a simple typology of
relationships, with the following major possibilities (Nelson 2005):
1. Separative‐separative (arm's length)
2. Soluble‐soluble (merger)
3. Separative‐soluble (domination or positionality)
4. Mutuality (individuals‐in‐relation, with mutual respect and consideration)
a. Symmetric mutuality (between similarly situated persons)
b. Asymmetric mutuality (between people in positions characterized by
unequal power, status, or resources)
This is not meant to be exhaustive, but to remind us of possibilities that remain unseen
if we start only with the model of radically autonomous, self‐contained and immutable
agents. In particular, the category of asymmetric mutuality is rarely examined in either
economics or Western philosophy in general, since it seems to be often assumed that
mutual respect can only happen in a democracy of equals. Yet such mutuality is what one
hopes characterizes every child's first and most formative—and necessarily uneven—
relationships, and which one hopes also exists between teachers and students, nurses and
patients, and in other relations of hierarchy. Asymmetric mutuality deserves more
examination, as does as the borderline between it and its perverse cousin, domination.
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Besides broader and richer thinking about the nature of relationships, we need a
richer and more precise vocabulary for speaking about human emotions and motivations.
In particular, the dualisms "intrinsic/extrinsic" and "self‐interest/altruism" are used in
widely varied ways in the existing economics literature, and—since they are overly
simplistic— often seem to add as much confusion to the discussion as elucidation. Within
and between categories of "self‐interest" and "altruism," for example, one can identify
variants including voracious greed, reasonable self‐care, expanded or enlightened
self‐interest, mutual reciprocity, utilitarianism, interdependent utility, the common good,
justice, compassion, agape, and outright sacrifice. These variants—and others
unnamed—all deserve more exploration and clarification.
Recognition of the complexity of relationships has very important real world
consequences: Many people are, for example, very limited in their thinking about
economic issues by the stereotypes of totally impersonal markets, purely profit‐oriented
firms, employment relations of sheer dominance and submission, states that work
seamlessly in the public interest, peacefully harmonious cooperatives, and/or families that
are never anything other than gentle and loving. Unpacking the variety of dynamics going
on in relationships is a critical step in letting more real world complexity into our
economic analysis (Nelson 2006).
Sometimes, however, rich and complex analysis seems to be exactly what
economists want to avoid. Richness can make life difficult to model. This brings us to our
next topic.

Gender and Economics II: Methodology and Demarcation
There is another set of outdated dualisms structuring economics which much of
HIR research has not, do date, much challenged. The aspiration of economists to be
considered as "hard" scientists still leads many to assiduously hold to the methodological
values shown on the left in Table 2. Quantification and precision are prized, and it is
often mistakenly believed that scientific objectivity is exemplified by process of
mathematical formalization and an eschewal of value positions. The gender schema is
clearly at work here as well: Women are culturally associated with more qualitative,
verbal, intuitive, and personal—and, by association, "inferior" and "weak"— approaches.
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Table 2: Splitting the World: Methodology Dualisms in Neoclassical Orthodoxy
Economics

Not Economics

quantitative
precise
formal
positive
objective
general

qualitative
rich
informal, verbal, or intuitive
normative
subjective (personal)
particular

masculine

feminine

The battles that HIR has waged so far on this front have been limited. Getting answers to
"Subjective Well‐Being" survey questions accepted as economic data has been an uphill
battle; perhaps it has been at least partially won because, at least, it produces quantitative
measures that can be inserted into econometric equations. In the still‐small literature on
economic relations, terms referring to qualitative and rich concepts such as "authenticity,"
"genuineness", or "care" have sometimes entered the conversation. Some researchers are
willing to look into the rich and non‐formalized history of economic thought for
inspiration on how to proceed (Bruni and Sugden 2007).
Yet often, it is assumed that qualitative work is just a stepping stone to
formalism—the "gold standard" for rigor—rather than something valuable and perhaps
unsurpassable on its own. In my experience, this is the "hot button" (or
amygdalastimulating) item for many economists. The subjects of our studies and
assumptions of our models may vary a bit, but threaten the hegemony of our formal
mathematics— and, in particular, our models of individual utility maximization
(henceforth, "Max U"), equilibria, game theory, or econometrics—and we feel suddenly
in danger of seriously losing our bearings. Even if we do not carry through with doing the
mathematical formalizing ourselves, we may feel that framing a problem in
utility‐theoretic and quantitatively measurable terms is an absolutely necessary step
towards rigorous and generalizable science. We may define "economics" itself in terms of
such achievement.
But, emotional first reactions aside, there are good scientific and practical reasons
to loosen the grip of this approach on our discipline. We can agree, I believe, that
scientific objectivity is about avoiding partial, biased, and unsupported views in order to
get the fullest and most impartial view of a phenomena possible. It is about taking an
open‐minded, systematic, and investigative approach to the world. Along with economist
Amartya Sen (1992), feminists argue that an adequate notion of objectivity comes from
the approach of submitting the results of any research for testing by larger communities
of scientists (Keller 1985; Longino 1990; Harding 1995), not from following a narrow
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methodology. Continued loyalty to Max U theorizing at all costs, in contrast, acts more
like a Procrustean bed: In forcing dimensions of a phenomenon to fit into a particular
pre‐determined mental framework, elements of reality that do not fit must be contorted or
lopped off.
Why is this a problem? First, nowhere in serious psychology or neuroscience—
unless imposed by collaboration with an economist—does one find support for the idea
that somewhere in the human mind is a mechanism that maximizes a single‐valued
function representing all we value in life. While economists habitually start from this
preexisting framework, in the larger project of scientific investigation any model should
have to prove, starting from the ground up, that it creates some "value‐added." I have
seen few economists so far, given the existing biases in the profession, even realize that
the Max U framework requires any justification, much less provide convincing proof of
its usefulness.6 Historically, the model of Max U did not come from empirical
observation of how people actually behave, but rather may be more directly traced to
John Stuart Mill's (1836) suggestion that economics model itself after geometry as a
"science" of pure deduction. Why that suggestion (much nuanced by Mill himself, though
not by later adopters) should still hold sway over contemporary economics is somewhat
of a mystery, perhaps only partly explained by its appeal to masculinist biases.
The second reason that Max U is a problem is that exclusions and distortions it
forces on us affect the reliability of what we think we know. As economists learned (or
should have learned) from the study of expectations in macroeconomics, taking only
selected aspects of a problem out of context, and then assuming that we have estimated
stable behavioral parameters on the base of partial information, is a procedure doomed to
failure. Questions such as "What makes us happy?" and more generally, "What is the
purpose of life?" and "How should we live?" —have troubled and inspired novelists,
poets, philosophers, theologians, and serious thinkers of all sorts for millennia. It will be
a pity if economists feel that these need to be translated into the rigid, one‐sided
framework of conventional modeling, before their implications for economic life can be
explored.
Let us examine some of the important aspects of HIR that are prevalent in
systematic and informed investigations of these topics in other disciplines, but not yet in
the economics literature. I suggest that a deeper self‐education in these areas, and further
exploration of them using rich concepts and, if necessary, qualitative methods such as
interviews, focus groups, narratives, and case studies, would be an extremely fruitful vein
for economists to pursue.
There are, for example, important dimensions of happiness identified in the
psychological literature that economists, with our focus on scales measuring SWB or life
satisfaction, or positive affect, have so far ignored. While psychologists Edward Diener
and Robert Biswas‐Diener, for example, sometimes use the term "happiness" to mean
only positive affect, their more general notion of human goals includes not only affect
and subjective life satisfaction, but also "the feeling that life is full of meaning…and a
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sense of spirituality that connects people to things larger than themselves" (2008, 6)—
topics they discuss at great length. Psychologist of happiness Jonathan Haidt also
discusses the role of belonging, meaning, and feelings of the sacred (2006, Chapters 6, 9,
and 10). Such factors as "belonging" and feeling a part of "things larger" than oneself do
not fit well into the methodological individualism of the Max U model. Meaning and
spirituality are not things that an individual agent can "have," in the same way that one
can "have" a dinner or a car.
For this reason, I have chosen to talk about "interpersonal relations" rather than
"relational goods" in this talk. The phrase "relational goods" seems to presuppose that
first we have an individual, and then that individual "has" relationships, meaning, and
happiness. Consider, though, the contrast between the following discussions presented
scholars from divergent fields. Economist Bruno Frey suggests that people may have "an
intrinsic motivation to care for others' welfare. For example, people care about recipients'
utility and receive a 'warm glow' from helping, or they benefit from intrinsic work
enjoyment" (2008, 80). Note Frey's implication is that people care because they get
something back, even if what they get back is just a good feeling. Religious studies
scholar Mikael Lundmark, on the other hand, points towards possible motivations other
than getting something back for oneself, in this passage on nursing:
For the sake of clarity, I propose that a factor like ‘nursing brings a sense of
meaning to life’ is extrinsic, whereas a factor like ‘nursing is the meaning of life’
is intrinsic. The major difference between these two factors is that the former is
motivational because it provides a sense of meaningfulness to life. The act of
nursing or being a nurse satisfies a need [for] feeling meaningfulness in life…The
latter factor is motivational because the act of nursing or being a nurse is a
consequence of a feeling that nursing is the meaning of the life.
(Lundmark 2007, 772)
This reverses the whole logic of the Max U model: Instead of a pre‐existing
individual going out and finding warm feelings or meaning to insert in their utility
function, the sort of action discussed by Lundmark arises from starting with a larger
whole of life, and locating one's role, identity, and meaning within it. Perhaps, while
Frey's notion comes from "separativeness," Lundmark's formulation verges on
"solubility." I suggest that the most interesting investigations will come from keeping
both the aspect of life having to do with individual agency, and the aspect of our mutual
co‐constitution in and through relationships, in tension with each other.
In addition to cross‐disciplinary analysis, cross‐cultural analysis can be
enlightening. Questions about individual life satisfaction, framed by researchers raised in
an individualistic culture, may more or less make sense when presented to people also
raised in an individualistic culture. The evidence suggests, however, that people are quite
differently oriented in more collectivist cultures. While a collectivist bent is most
commonly associated with certain traditional Asian communities, it is arguably also
characteristic of women's cultures in communities built around separate‐soluble gender
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traditions. Consider, for example, the response of one woman in South India to
questioning from Robert Biswas‐Diener about her level of happiness: "You should go ask
my husband how he feels right now, and then you will know how I feel" (Diener and
Biswas‐Diener 2008, 134). "Individualists weight their happy feelings more when
reporting life satisfaction," Diener and Biswas‐Diener report, while "collectivists…are
more likely to feel good when the group they are a part of is getting along well" (Diener
and Biswas‐Diener 2008, 134). While the woman in South India obviously goes to a
"soluble" extreme, I have to wonder whether some people interviewed with standard
surveys might like to also question the questions: "What do you mean, how happy am I?
How can I be happy when my neighbors are hungry?" Or, for the more globally
conscious, "How can I be happy while people are being slaughtered in Darfur? Or "While
the health of my grandchildren is threatened by rising levels of CO2?"
And here, of course, one enters the paradox that happiness is most likely to
come to people who are not directly seeking it. Much of the literature suggests that
deep, long‐lasting happiness is a side effect of serving others, appreciating beauty, not
being self‐centered, experiencing the sacred, and being willing to put up with a certain
amount of stress and negative affect in the pursuit of meaningful goals. Deiner and
Biswas‐Diener argue that happiness in the sense of maximizing positive affect is not a
good thing to maximize: Some amounts of negative affect are helpful (21, 44). Guilt, for
example, can be a useful emotion for keeping societies together. They advise, "In order to
make happy choices, listen to your heart, don't worry about getting the very best all the
time, and evaluate each outcome on its own merits rather than against others." (177,
emphasis added). Psychologist of happiness Haidt concurs (2006, 102).
Being more hesitant to reduce a problem to a single quantifiable maximand, and
more open to qualitative methods, then, would be a useful direction for further economic
research. A study in the most recent issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, for
example, combines survey and interview data to good effect. Sergei Guriev and Ekaterina
Zhuravskaya (2009) complement quantitative analysis from the World Values Survey
with interviews that delve into the various dimensions of, and reasons for, satisfaction
and dissatisfaction. The focus‐group interview data allows them to—without imposing a
pre‐set framework or set of possible answers on their subjects—examine the roles played
by increasing inequality, deteriorated public goods, changed aspiration levels, and other
factors mentioned by these groups. Quotes from the qualitative information enliven the
article.
Being less focused on finding precise and elegant conclusions, and more tolerant
of richer and more complex analysis, would also pay off for HIR researchers in warning
us away from misleading aggregation. I am puzzled, for example, when a researcher
claims that "divorce is beneficial" based on positive changes in average happiness (Frey
2008, 92). The slightest familiarity with real‐world social relations should make it
obvious that the distribution could be expected to be wildly bi‐modal, between those who
instigate a divorce and those who find it thrust upon them. I always tell my Statistics
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students about the statistician who drowned trying to cross a stream that was an average
of a few centimeters deep.
A better‐educated and cross‐disciplinary approach would, in addition, protect us
from presenting biased or shallow results as if they are capturing the full phenomenon
under study. Measuring the number of social groups people belong to, whether they are
married or not, and the frequency of their church attendance, for example, can be an
interesting exercise. But we need to stay aware that answers to such survey questions still
leave us very far from addressing many of the really interesting questions about
happiness. Happiness is certainly as much about quality as it is about quantity, and such
questions capture nothing about the authenticity of a person's relationships or their
experience of the sacred.
Going beyond our customary methods, of course, might mean learning new skills
of primary data gathering and qualitative analysis, and perhaps, correspondingly, making
somewhat less use of many of our existing mathematical modeling skills. This may be an
unattractive idea to many, since there is a natural human inclination to want to put one's
skills, in which one has deeply invested, to good use. We teach our undergraduates,
however, that rational decision making requires ignoring sunk costs— that is, past
resource allocations that are now "water under the bridge." Rational decision‐making, we
say, means moving on to see a problem in terms of current and future issues. If we want
to venture into psychological and social issues, and the best research in psychology and
social psychology tell us that our existing approaches are too narrow and limiting, then it
is time to change our approaches.
Going beyond Max U would also, of course, tend to mean that our studies may no
longer be as characterized by as much formality and the elegance, parsimony, abstract
generality, and precision that formalism potentially brings with it. But while elegance,
parsimony, abstract generality, and precision are good things to have, they are far from
the only things we should be valuing in science. Giving up precision simply to be "vague"
would be a bad idea, but sometimes when dealing with the complexity, richness, and
particularity of real world phenomena, we would be better off balancing our desire for
precision with an appreciation for richness of analysis, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5
M+
Precise
elegant

F+
Rich,
realistic

M–
Thin,
unrealistic

F–
Imprecise,
vague
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In this way, methods of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis, formalized and less
formal analysis, research where we try to take the most general and multiperspective‐
informed objective viewpoint, and research where we own up to our particular
perspectives and values, can all be seen as complementary rather than competitive or
hierarchically ordered. And maybe, with appropriate modesty and a willingness to
exercise our brains past long‐held gender schemas, we will be able to get more than a
shallow grasp on the issues of HIR.
Does this mean that economics will lose its identity as a distinct field? If we limit
ourselves to currently popular definitions of the field, this certainly seems a possibility.
Definitions of economics often center around rational choice, or markets, or the modeling
technique of Max U. But the definition of economics as the science of abstract rational
choice is undercut by the discovery of the importance of emotions and other bodily,
evolved processes. Discovery of the importance of intrinsic motivations and sociality in
creating well‐being challenge the idea that economics is all about market exchange.
Questions of the adequacy of methods challenge the definition in terms of Max U
formalism.
Will economics then become nothing different from psychology, sociology, or the
humanities? I think not, although there are many significant possibilities for collaboration
across these fields. An important—and very old—definition, still used by economists of
feminist, social, and institutional stripes—is that economics is the study of the ways
societies organize themselves to provide for the survival and flourishing of life. This
definition does not rely on dogmas, or on biased valence given to "hard" versus "soft"
analysis, yet it distinguishes the field from others that do not have "provisioning" as their
central concern. It also defines the field, not in terms of artificial boundaries of an
intellectual playground, but in terms of the sort of analysis that we all need to live, and to
continue to evolve as a species. In a time of broken economies, broken financial and state
institutions, and a broken planet, dedicating ourselves anew to studying the task of
providing for survival and flourishing would be a noble and worthwhile pursuit.

Conclusion
As researchers in the areas of happiness and interpersonal relations have pointed
out, human behavior is actually much complex than imagined within neoclassical
orthodoxy. The neuroscience of cognitive gender schemas can help explain why certain
partial views have been so persistent—that is, why topics and assumptions associated
with masculinity and "hardness" have long enjoyed unquestioned, though undeserved,
high status. We as a discipline have historically spent far too much time resisting
becoming "soft," when we should have instead‐‐if we want a truly scientific,
open‐minded, systematic and investigative approach to the world‐‐have been rooting out
archaic dogma, including biases of a "masculinist" variety.
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Yet the persistence of a one‐sided reliance on individualist models and rigid
formalization in much of the study of happiness and interpersonal relations is a sign that
we still have far to go in overcoming our ingrained, schematic processing habits. Being
able to think outside these boxes—being able to respond appropriately to the task at hand,
instead of some other past experiences and positional aspirations that shaped our
thought—is a sign of mental agility and vitality. Here's hoping that continued research in
happiness and interpersonal relations will be marked by such agility and vitality.

Julie A. Nelson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Development and
Environment Institute at Tufts University and an Associate Professor of Economics at the
University of Massachusetts, Boston; inquiries can be directed to Julie.Nelson@tufts.edu
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NOTES
1

Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1980) argued in their book Metaphors We Live
By that much of our way of understanding and speaking about the world is build on just such basic bodily
experiences. Not having 21st century neuroscience at hand when I began my work in this area, my early
work on gender and economics used Lakoff and Johnson's insights along with those of psychologist Sandra
Bem (1981) (Nelson 1992).
2

For example, see Pugno (2007), Bechhetti, Pelloni, et al (2008), and Uhlaner (1989).

3

For example, Bruni and Sugden (2009) emphasize a concept of "structural" team reasoning in which, it
seems, individual motivation may play no role at all. Van Winden, Stallen et al. write about the "merger
between the self and other into some shared identity, accompanied by a ('we') feeling of bonding..Oneness"
(forthcoming, 17).

4

It is never explained, for example, in Bruni and Stanca (2008), whether time spent with one's own spouse
or children is included in "time with family." Bruni and Sugden lament that in relationships, "Sadly,
dependency is sometimes unavoidable," (2009) but is this really so sad in the case of children? Sacco,
Vanin and Zamagni write that "Examples of socially provided goods include friendship, social approval,
social identification, mates and social status" (2004). Relations of care, such as the care given from parents
to children, is conspicuously absent. Many authors (e.g. Clark, Frijters et al. 2008, 118; Frey 2008) take as
definitive Becker's partial views on the family, which emphasize altruism or reciprocity and specialization,
while downplaying issues of power and benefits from diversity in tasks activities. Within the psychology of
happiness and relationships, of course, family relationships and especially parent‐child relationships play a
pivotal role (e.g. Haidt 2006).

5

This also carries over into professional work: Women in the profession of nursing are sometimes assumed
to be interested exclusively in the well‐being of their patients, and not at all in receiving fair payment for
their time. See Nelson and Folbre (2006) for a discussion.
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